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SPECIAL SECTION ON RETHINKING LENINISM 
 
Leninism: It’s Not What You Think 
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Leninism is universally understood as involving an emphasis on centralism and 
discipline inside the workers’ party, a centralism and discipline necessary as a counter 
to the centralized power of the capitalist state. This article argues: 1) that Lenin’s 
famous centralism was a necessity imposed on all socialists of his generation because 
of conditions of tsarist autocracy; 2) that when given the chance during moments of 
revolutionary upheaval, this centralism was pushed to the background, and a heavy 
emphasis was placed upon democracy and debate; 3) that late in life, Lenin realized 
that the ‘Leninism’ being aggressively promoted by the Communist International was 
too heavily weighted towards Russian conditions, and was a barrier to the development 
of the left outside of Russia; and 4) that this immanent critique of actually-existing 
Leninism was cut short and buried by the rise of Stalinism, for which an emphasis on 
centralism was a useful counterpart in party organization to the authoritarianism being 
constructed in the Stalinist state. 
 
Résumé: 
On pense généralement que le léninisme insiste sur le centralisme et la discipline dans 
le parti ouvrier, centralisme et discipline nécessaires pour contrer le pouvoir centralisé 
de l’état capitaliste. Cet article defend que: 1) le centralisme célèbre de Lénine était 
une nécessité impose à tous les socialistes de sa génération du fait de l’autocratie 
tsariste; 2) dès lors qu’il y avait un espace pendant les moments de bouleversement 
révolutionnaire, ce centralisme était mis en retrait et un accent lourd était mis sur la 
démocratie et le débat; 3) plus tard dans sa vie, Lénine a réalisé que le ‘léninisme’ qui 
était promu d’une façon agressive par l’Internationale communiste était trop 
lourdement biaisé par le contexte russe et que ceci était une barrière au 
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développement de la gauche en dehors de la Russie; et 4) cette critique immanente du 
léninisme en place a été muselée et enterrée par l’ascension du stalinisme, pour qui 
l’accent sur le centralisme était un parallèle utile dans l’organisation du parti à 
l’autoritarisme en construction dans l’état staliniste. 
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‘There is no question that literature is least of all subject to mechanical 
adjustment or levelling, to the rule of the majority over the minority. There 
is no question, either, that in this field greater scope must undoubtedly be 
allowed for personal initiative, individual inclination, thought and fantasy’ 
(Liebman 1975, 50-51). This was a comment on criteria for socialist 
publications written by a Russian socialist the year following the great 
1905 revolution. 
 The author goes further. S/he has the following comments on 
internal party organization, arguing that ‘the principal organizational units 
of the Party’ must be ‘the local organizations... in fact, and not merely in 
name,’ going on to insist that ‘all the higher-standing bodies’ should be 
‘elected, accountable, and subject to recall’ (51). Further, ‘the autonomy of 
every Party organization, which hitherto has been largely a dead letter, 
must become a reality.’ 
 Contrast this with the viewpoint of the Third Congress of the 
Communist International (or Comintern) in 1921. ‘The leading Party 
district committee and, ultimately, the central leading body of the Party 
controls the activity and the correct functioning and composition of all the 
committees subordinate to it’ (Koenen 1983, 256). Now that is much more 
familiar to us, a clear precondition for what the American Leninist, James 
Cannon, called, ‘the Bolshevik discipline, the iron hardness, the capacity for 
decisive action... which a party of Leninism must have’ (Cannon 1924). 
 Here’s the problem – the advocate of fantasy in the pages of the 
socialist press, the advocate of the autonomy of every Party organization, 
the advocate of seeing the local organizations as the principal units of the 
Party – that advocate was the original Leninist, Vladimir Lenin (Lenin 
1978a, 46; 1978b, 376). And Lenin’s considered response to the ‘hard 
Leninism’ of the Third Congress of the Comintern (‘considered’ because a 
year earlier he had praised the resolution uncritically) is worth quoting at 
length: 
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The resolution is an excellent one, but it is almost entirely Russian... everything 
in it is based on Russian conditions ... I am sure that no foreigner can read it... 
they will not understand it because it is too Russian ... because it is thoroughly 
imbued with the Russian spirit... [I]f by way of exception some foreigner does 
understand it, he cannot carry it out.... [W]e made a big mistake with this 
resolution... we blocked our own road to further success (Lenin 1980, 418). 
This is evidence, this article argues, of a discontinuity – a very large 
discontinuity – between what most people think Leninism is (the 
authoritarian, top-down, steel-hard party) and the ‘Leninism’ that Lenin 
himself thought appropriate for liberal democracies in advanced capitalist 
societies: party organization that allowed tremendous scope for debate, 
disagreement and discussion, party organization where the central unit 
was not the Central Committee, but the local organization, party 
organization imbued with democracy from top to bottom. The tremendous 
value of Marcel Liebman’s now classic study, Leninism under Lenin, is that 
he – more than any other author – clearly highlights this discontinuity. The 
Leninism with which we became acquainted in the liberal democracies of 
the West was not the Leninism being advocated by, amongst others, 
Vladimir Lenin. 
 There is another reason to base this article in large part on 
Liebman. There is a new and welcome revival of Lenin scholarship that is 
attempting to peel back the misconceptions and abuses of past analyses, 
and finally to place our understanding of Lenin in a clear light, one that 
avoids both demonization and idolatry. Lars T. Lih – insisting on 
contextualizing the debates of the Russian left, very much in the spirit of 
Liebman – has written a detailed, scholarly recreation of the context and 
meaning of the oft-misunderstood What is to be Done? (Lih 2006). 
However, not all scholars are using such an approach. Slavoj Žižek is 
probably getting more sound bites than any other figure in the new revival 
of Lenin studies. The difficulty is that Žižek’s interpretation of Lenin 
repeats many of the mistakes made by Leninists in the 1970s – including a 
romanticization of the role of the individual – Lenin – and a picture of 
Leninist organizational theory which shows little sensitivity to the way 
Lenin himself was aware of the very different kind of party organization 
required in the liberal-capitalist ‘West.’ Even worse, in his Revolution at the 
Gates (Žižek 2002) he has a confusing and at times insulting section with 
the appalling title, ‘The Inner Greatness of Stalinism’ (165-336). 
 In our generation’s revival of Lenin studies we need to bring back 
the best of the last generation (critical scholarship along the lines of 
Liebman) and avoid the pitfall of re-linking Lenin to Stalin. This article both 
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re-introduces a new generation to the careful scholarship of Marcel 
Liebman, and in so doing paints a picture of the ‘pro-fantasy’ Lenin about 
which so little has been developed in the ‘Leninism’ which made its way to 
the West. There is a complex and buried lived history of Lenin and the 
original Leninists that – taken seriously – demands a sharp rethinking of 
our inherited conception of Leninism, and for those who have been 
influenced by Leninism, a careful rethinking of what ‘Leninism’ means in 
the context of liberal democracies in advanced capitalism. 
 
Recontextualizing Lenin 
It is important, Liebman argues, ‘not to separate the doctrine from the 
historical setting in which it arose and developed. An analysis of Leninism 
must be a history of Leninism in its living evolution, and no history of 
Leninism can be separated from the history of the Russian revolution’ 
(Liebman 1975, 21). By contrast, many ‘works concerned with his 
teachings tend to isolate them from their historical context’ (21). When 
theory and practice are decontextualized and artificially transplanted into 
extremely different conditions, when party organization is so ‘thoroughly 
imbued with the Russian spirit’ that either the non-Russian ‘will not 
understand it’ or if s/he understands it ‘cannot carry it out’, the result is, at 
best, a caricature. 
 With this method, we can examine the legendary ‘authoritarianism’ 
of Leninist organization. From 1903 on, the Russian socialists were divided 
into two principal groups, the Bolsheviks (Lenin’s section) and the 
Mensheviks. Up to 1905, the Bolsheviks were organized in an extremely 
centralized fashion. In particular, the committees ‘made up exclusively of 
professional revolutionaries’ had ‘almost unlimited powers’ in relation to 
other members of the Party. In selecting local committees and structures, 
‘the principle of co-option’ – that is of leading bodies selecting people, as 
opposed to having them elected by the membership – ‘was applied “from 
top to bottom”’ (44). However, these two characteristics – ‘the important 
role played by the committees, and the absence of any electoral 
procedure... was characteristic of all Russia’s socialist organizations down 
to 1905’ (45). There was nothing specifically ‘Leninist’ about this – it was 
simply a question of survival. In later years, two leading Russian socialists 
– Georgi Plekhanov and Julius Martov – were to become critics of Lenin’s 
methods. But in the early 1900s, these two ‘were also agreed in 
considering that, in the circumstances prevailing in Russia, any 
revolutionary, or indeed any political organization must depend for its 
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strength upon centralization; for them, the need for cohesion and secrecy 
had to be given priority over the desire for large-scale recruiting’ (28-29). 
 The ‘circumstances prevailing’ would be completely foreign to 
activists whose experience is confined to liberal democracies in the 
advanced capitalist world. Russia was an autocracy. Socialist work was 
carried out underground. Most of the leading members were in exile – in 
Western Europe if they were lucky, in the misery of Siberia if they were 
not. Arrests were constant. Liebman, in another of his excellent books, 
paints an extremely clear picture of the circumstances in which Russian 
socialists operated. 
It was the twentieth century, but at the far side of Europe, Russia was still in 
many respects in the Middle Ages; poverty and ignorance continued 
unchecked... In pre-revolutionary Russia, autocracy was... maintained by brute 
force and often by sheer terror. The Tsarist regime was permanently identified 
with the negation of all liberties.... [T]he very notion of freedom seemed 
incompatible with Tsarism. None of the political liberties that had long since 
been written into Western law existed in Russia before the 1905 Revolution. No 
opposition of any form was tolerated ... (Liebman 1970, 15-23). 
Lenin had ‘constant trouble’ in getting his paper ‘Iskra into the [Russian] 
empire. Trusted persons returning legally were provided with double-
bottomed trunks ... Or there was an outright smuggling through the 
frontier post’. All of this ‘tended to multiply the usual hazards of 
revolutionary and conspiratorial existence. The archives of the Tsarist 
police make it clear that they were very well informed as to the identity of 
many agents ... Frequent arrests disrupted the network’ (Ulam 1971, 167-
168). 
 These conditions affected socialists, no matter what their 
organization. ‘As a report by a Russian socialist to the Second International 
put it, “We fall not only in bloody fights, but also while printing our 
pamphlets, while selling books, distributing journals and tracts, speaking at 
meetings, holding conferences ... The average life of a committee is one to 
two months, that of a paper, one to two issues”’ (Liebman 1970, 64). 
 Economically, Russia was equally far removed from advanced 
capitalism. The vast majority of the population was made up of peasants, 
only achieving emancipation from serfdom in the 1860s. Before 
emancipation, in the first half of the 19th century, serfs had an ‘average 
death rate in excess of 40 per 1,000, a figure more than one-third higher 
than that of southern slaves [under plantation slavery in pre-civil war 
United States] and similar to that of Caribbean slaves. Especially appalling 
Socialist Studies: the Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies 5(2) Fall 2009: 41-63 
46 
was the mortality of young children... official statistics from Orel province 
[showed that] 60.9% of the province’s recorded deaths in 1858 were of 
children five and under’ (Kolchin 1987, 153). 
 In Peter Kolchin’s magnificent comparative study of serfdom in 
Russia and plantation slavery in the United States, there is a graphic 
description of the bitter reality of serf life in winter. 
[P]easant huts... were small, and their dominant feature was the stove that 
served not only as a place to prepare food but more important as a source of 
heat near – and on – which family members huddled and slept. In summer 
peasants often escaped their teeming quarters to sleep out of doors ‘in hay 
lofts, in sheds, in the yard,’ but most of the year they crowded together for 
warmth. ‘The peasant family in the winter lives in the same hut as its cattle,’ 
wrote one observer, who noted the prevalent ‘dampness and stench’ as well.... 
[W]rote another... ‘the pregnant, sick, old, and young’ rarely ventured far from 
[the stove in winter] (Kolchin 1987,151). 
Liberation from serfdom was an important step, but life in the countryside 
remained extremely miserable. Semyon Ivanovich Kanatchikov described 
his ‘free peasant’ childhood in grim, sardonic, prose. 
My early childhood was not accompanied by any particularly outstanding 
events, unless one counts the fact that I survived; I wasn’t devoured by a pig, I 
wasn’t butted by a cow, I didn’t drown in a pool, and I didn’t die of some 
infectious disease the way thousands of peasant children perished in those 
days... my own mother, according to some sources, brought eighteen children 
into this world – according to others the number was twelve – yet only four of 
us survived (Kanatchikov 1986, 1). 
Kanatchikov was one of hundreds of thousands who left these miserable 
conditions to migrate to industry and the cities. But for the first 
generations to escape to the cities, life was still miserable, and far removed 
from the reality of advanced capitalism. 
Our workday at the factory lasted eleven and a half hours, plus a one-and-a-
half-hour lunch break. In the beginning I would grow terribly tired so that as 
soon as I got home from work and ate dinner, I would fall into my filthy, hard, 
straw-filled sack and sleep like a dead man, despite the myriad bed bugs and 
fleas.... We rented the apartment communally, as an artel of about fifteen 
men.... [My] room contained two wooden cots. One belonged to Korovin, my 
countryman and guardian; the other I shared with Korovin’s son Vanka.... All 
fifteen men ate from a common bowl with wooden spoons. The cabbage soup 
contained little pieces of meat. First, they would ladle out only the soup then, 
when the soup was almost all gone, everyone tensely awaited a signal. A 
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moment later someone would bang his spoon against the edge of the soup 
basin and say the words we were waiting for: ‘Dig in!’ Then began the furious 
hunt of the spoons for the floating morsels of meat. The more dexterous would 
come up with the most (Kanatchikov 1986, 9). 
It has been necessary to spell out in some detail these political, social and 
economic conditions. Too often they are ignored, or at least under-
appreciated. These conditions cannot just be a footnote. An honest theorist 
has to attempt to assimilate them in their entirety. Without such an 
attempt, analyses of ‘Leninism’ are completely one-dimensional, 
completely formal, scholastic and empty. These are the ‘Russian conditions’ 
that Lenin warned would be incomprehensible to ‘foreigners’. 
Now Lenin, in making this warning, did not indicate exactly which 
‘foreigners’ would have a difficult time ‘translating from the Russian.’ But 
we can have no doubt that he was referring to the socialists operating in 
the advanced capitalist countries – Britain, France and particularly 
Germany. As early as 1918 he had argued that ‘our salvation... is an all-
Europe revolution... it is the absolute truth that without a German 
revolution we are doomed’ (Lenin 1977b, 95, 98). He was also aware then 
– certainly not as clearly as in 1922, but certainly aware – that ‘the world 
socialist revolution cannot begin so easily in the advanced countries as the 
revolution began in Russia’ (Lenin 1977b, 98) that conditions in Germany, 
France and Britain were quite different from those in Russia: ‘[I]n a 
country in which capitalism is developed and has given democratic culture 
and organisation to everybody, down to the last man... there we are only 
just approaching the painful period of the beginning of socialist 
revolutions’ (Lenin 1977b, 99). 
In his ‘too Russian’ speech of 1922, he is underlying and amplifying 
this fact. There could be no straight line drawn between Tsarism and 
liberal democracy, between Russian economic backwardness and West 
European economic development. Similarly, there could be no straight line 
drawn between the organizational conclusions developed by the Russian 
socialists as a survival mechanism, and the organizational requirements of 
socialists operating in liberal democracies inside advanced capitalist 
economies. Given these ‘Russian conditions,’ who could argue with the 
need for a tight, top-down, centralized organization? In fact, as was pointed 
out above, serious socialists did not so argue. The elective principle and 
open organizational forms did not operate with either the Bolsheviks or 
the Mensheviks. To do so would have meant infiltration by the secret 
police, collapse and failure. 
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1905 and the ‘democratic centralist moment’ 
However – what would happen if these conditions were suddenly to 
transform into their opposite? That is precisely what happened – briefly – 
during the revolutionary upsurge of 1905-06, and in that changed context 
‘Leninism’ became unrecognizable. 
 The revolution of 1905 was a social and political earthquake. The 
year opened with a horrible massacre, when Tsarist soldiers opened fire 
on hundreds of thousands of demonstrating workers, killing hundreds. A 
massive wave of sympathy strikes swept the country, receded, and then 
exploded again in September with a strike of typesetters, followed by a 
general strike, followed by the beautiful establishment of the St. Petersburg 
Soviet, or Workers’ Council. Thoroughgoing, city-wide democracy under 
the leadership of the urban working masses emerged for only the second 
time in history (the first being the Paris Commune thirty-five years 
earlier). In this context, Tsarist repression was for a moment swept aside. 
Public debate was everywhere, the socialist parties could operate openly, 
exiles could return to Russia, meetings could happen, newspapers could be 
sold – it was a flowering of freedom never before seen in the country. 
 ‘The upheaval in the country in 1905,’ writes Liebman, 
entailed an upheaval hardly less thoroughgoing in the Party. ‘It will be 
necessary in very many cases to start from the beginning,’ Lenin declared in 
November 1905. This will to renovation found expression in the democratizing 
of the Party’s structures and methods. As Martov testifies, ‘the leaders of both 
factions applied themselves with vigour to getting the elective principle 
accepted’ (Liebman 1975, 49). 
The British socialist Tony Cliff documents how this opening up of the 
party put Lenin up against the very Leninists formed in the earlier period. 
At the third congress of the Bolshevik Party in the spring of 1905, Lenin 
lost a vote to open up the party to the newly radicalizing workers:  
Most of the delegates to the Congress were committee-men who were 
opposed to any move which would tend to weaken their authority over the 
rank and file. Buttressing themselves with quotations from What is to be Done? 
(a text written by Lenin in 1901 and 1902, usually seen as the ‘textbook’ for 
those seeking a centralized party based on professional revolutionaries), they 
called for ‘extreme caution’ in admitting workers into the committees and 
condemned ‘playing at democracy’ (Cliff 1975, 175). 
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Lenin eventually won the argument – arguing often against ideas he had 
helped formulate – the gates of the party opened, and a new democratic 
structure and practice swept aside those of the past:  
The Bolshevik congress of 1905 declared in favour of ‘the autonomy of the 
committees’ in relation to the Central Committee, whose authority was 
seriously pruned... At the head of the socialist movement in Petersburg a 
conference was placed – an elected body, meeting at least twice a month, 
subject to re-election every six months, and itself electing the Party Committee 
in the capital... Lenin recommended that, as a general rule, a ‘referendum in 
the Party’ should be carried out where any important political question was 
concerned (Liebman 1975, 50). 
Riding the wave of revolution, his party and all the left parties grew 
impressively. ‘In January 1905, on the eve of the revolution, the Bolshevik 
organizations had 8,400 members altogether. By the spring of 1906 the 
total membership of the RSDLP [the Russian Social Democratic Labour 
Party] stood at 48,000, of whom 34,000 were Bolsheviks and 14,000 
Mensheviks. In October the total membership exceeded 70,000’ (47). This 
revolutionary tide created pressures none of the party leaders could 
ignore, pressures in particular to end the split between the Bolsheviks and 
the Mensheviks, a split which had developed in confusing circumstances in 
1903. So at Stockholm in 1906, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks re-united 
into one socialist organization. 
 Now, it is not uncommon to recognize ‘discipline’ and ‘centralism’ as 
features of Leninism. But perhaps the most recognizable phrase in the 
dictionary of Leninism is the term ‘democratic centralism.’ What few 
realize is that this term was not developed by Lenin during the period of 
repression and tight centralization. It was not, in other words, a term used 
to insist on the necessity of centralism as part of a polemic against too 
loose an organizational structure and too much democracy. It was a term 
first introduced in 1906 at the unity Congress, in the period of revolution 
in 1905 and 1906 as part of a polemic against too much centralism, too 
tight an organizational structure and too little democracy.  
 Lenin said, in his report to the 1906 unification congress ‘that there 
was still work to be done to “really to apply the principles of democratic 
centralism in Party organization, to work tirelessly to make the local 
organizations the principal organizational units of the Party in fact and not 
merely in name, and to see to it that all the higher-standing bodies are 
elected, accountable and subject to recall.”’ The application of democratic 
centralism ‘implies universal and full freedom to criticize, so long as this 
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does not disturb the unity of a definite action’ (Liebman 1975, 51). This 
didn’t just mean criticism in the privacy of internal Party meetings. 
‘Criticism within the limits of the principles of the Party Programme must 
be quite free... not only at Party meetings, but also at public meetings. Such 
criticism, or such ‘agitation’ (for criticism is inseparable from agitation) 
cannot be prohibited’ (Lenin 1978c, 442-443). 
 For Liebman, Lenin’s synthesis of criticism and action is clear: 
‘Freedom of discussion, unity of action. What still needed to be clarified 
was, who was to have the power to issue these “calls for action”? ... Lenin’s 
answer was clear: only the Party Congress possessed such power. At the 
same time, however, Lenin thought it was legitimate, in certain 
circumstances, to “fight ideologically against those decisions of the 
Congress which we regard as erroneous”’ (Liebman 1975, 51-52). 
 This insistence on openness and democracy really should not be 
surprising. The construction of a socialist organization is part of a counter-
hegemonic project. The hegemony it is countering is one where centralism 
is ubiquitous. This is embedded in the structures of the economy, which 
are organized in a completely centralized, hierarchical, anti-democratic 
fashion. There is, however, the important reality of democracy in formal 
state structures. This is a product of generations of struggle. But this 
democracy is kept within very strict limits, too often being more formal 
than real. Given the authoritarian nature of the private, capitalist economy 
and the restricted nature of formal, political democracy, it is not surprising 
that apathy, deference, subservience and passivity are everyday realities of 
life under capitalism. Under conditions of autocracy they are enforced 
through coercion. But since the time of Gramsci, we have become all too 
aware of the way in which they can, in liberal democracies, be just as easily 
– and sometimes more easily – enforced through consent. This then 
reinforces the centralism that is also ubiquitous. Apathy, deference, 
subservience and passivity are necessary accompaniments to centralism 
and hierarchy. We see this everywhere. Bureaucratic decision-making in 
the state apparatus is a completely hierarchical, centralized process. 
Churches are built from the top down. Unions again and again evolve into 
centralized, undemocratic, bureaucratically-run machines. The truth is, we 
get very little exposure to consultation and democracy in the normal 
course of life in capitalist society. Centralism is part of our DNA. Democracy 
is not. It should not be surprising, then, that when possible, a counter-
hegemonic political project needs to put a strong emphasis upon creating 
and nurturing democratic structures. 
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 This was certainly the orientation for the Lenin shaped by the 
Revolution of 1905. But this aspect of Lenin’s practice – the insistence on 
local autonomy, on freedom of criticism (in public and in private), on 
frequent elections and frequent meetings to make actual the accountability 
of elected committees – this aspect of Lenin’s practice is almost never 
mentioned, let alone analyzed. Perhaps this is because centralism comes 
much easier to those whose only experience is that of capitalism. 
Centralism is the easy part. Democracy is what it will take a fight to 
achieve. Whatever the reason, Liebman’s book was, and is, an 
indispensable corrective to a century of Leninology. 
 
Tsarism and Stalinism 
Among the reasons for the silencing of the democratic, ‘pro-fantasy’ Lenin, 
two in particular need to be highlighted. The first is the overwhelming 
weight of the life experiences of Lenin and his generation, experiences 
dominated by conditions that demanded harsh centralism in organization 
questions. The second is the long night of Stalinism. A particularly 
authoritarian version of ‘Leninism’ was the perfect party organizational 
counterpart to the extreme totalitarianism of Stalin’s Russia. 
 In terms of Lenin’s life experiences, the difficulties confronting 
socialists in Russia have already been outlined. Lenin was introduced to 
politics through the execution of his brother, had the ‘luxury’ of working 
out his political economy because of the peace and quiet of exile in Siberia, 
and spent most of his pre-revolutionary life in exile to escape from the 
Tsarist police. The 1905-1906 flowering of de facto political liberty was an 
all too-brief window into open, public, democratic organizing. First in 
Moscow, in the savage repression which followed the armed uprising in 
December 1905, and then by stages elsewhere in the country, reaction 
began to reassert itself. By 1907, the tsarist regime was on the offensive, 
rolling back the workers’ gains, and the impact was staggering. Socialist 
organizations inside Russia were infiltrated by the secret police, and 
shattered. Many socialists – including Lenin – had to return to exile, where 
most lived in abject poverty, despair and isolation (Cliff 1975, 235-252). In 
such conditions, talk of the elective principle, frequent meetings, wide-
scale recruitment and all the other accoutrements of the ‘democratic 
centralist moment’ were impossible. The party survived this period, rebuilt 
itself during the working class upsurge of 1912-14, only to be again forced 
underground during the horror of world war. It was, in other words, a 
party forged in conditions unimaginable to socialists in today’s liberal 
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democracies. Not surprisingly, the organizational forms the Russian 
socialists had to adopt were harsh, and, to our eyes, ‘authoritarian.’ In a 
certain sense this ‘authoritarianism’ is not the surprising thing. How could 
it be otherwise, in a situation where any ‘openness’ would be exploited by 
the repressive state? What is surprising, is that in the brief ‘democratic 
centralist moment’ of 1905-1906, Lenin absolutely enthusiastically 
reached towards decentralization and democracy, and that again even in 
the harsh 1922 conditions in a workers’ state surrounded by hostile 
imperialism, he could see clearly the need not to mechanically transplant 
organizational norms appropriate to Russian Tsarism onto the democratic, 
advanced capitalist stage of Western Europe. 
 Given the weight of a lifetime’s experience, where democracy was a 
luxury and centralism a necessity, it is perhaps understandable that Lenin’s 
‘democratic centralist’ moment has been obscured. But by the time Lenin 
was trying to revive this democratic centralism, making an argument that 
liberal democracies required a different kind of ‘Leninism’ than had been 
appropriate in Russia, a new factor had emerged. Josef Stalin was gathering 
the forces around himself that were eventually to drown the gains of the 
Russian Revolution in blood, and install a monstrous dictatorship in its 
place. It was in November and December 1922 that Lenin wrote the lines 
warning the foreign communists about the ‘too Russian’ organizational 
norms being thrust upon them. But Lenin was a very sick man, and he had 
new and powerful enemies. 
On May 25th, 1922, Lenin suffered his first crisis of arteriosclerosis: his right 
hand and leg became paralyzed and his speech impaired. After a long 
convalescence, he returned to work in the first days of October 1922. On 
December 13th another attack forced Lenin to retire definitively. On March 10th, 
1923, after an attack that occurred three days earlier, he finally lost the power 
of speech. He died on January 22nd, 1924. Behind these dates and details of 
Lenin’s health, however, lies ‘Lenin’s last struggle’, which was a struggle not 
only against illness but also, and above all, for Leninism and socialism. And 
never did Lenin the fighter have to fight harder or in more painful 
circumstances (Liebman 1975, 417-18). 
As Lenin battled for his life, Stalin manoeuvred to undermine his authority, 
and to prevent his writings from being made public. One of the defining 
political issues of Lenin’s life had been his insistence on the right of the 
oppressed national minorities, in Russia and elsewhere, to assert their own 
cultural and political autonomy and independence. For Lenin this was a 
hallmark of both self-determination and socialism. Any left project was a 
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dead letter without it. From his sick bed, he became alarmed at the 
repression being levelled by Stalin against the oppressed nationalities in 
the Caucasus. In spite of being ‘up against a persistent refusal to co-
operate...’ 
He did indeed fight, wresting information and concessions from those in 
control of him, and preparing, bit by bit, an immense report, which he intended 
for the Party congress that was soon to take place... [W]hen, by a miracle of 
effort, Lenin managed to dictate some articles and notes, he had to fight again 
to get the Party leadership to publish the material that he sent to Pravda. In the 
Political Bureau they even discussed having a single copy of Pravda printed for 
Lenin’s benefit, containing an article he wanted published but which they 
would have preferred not to make known to the general public.... Cut off... 
from the outside world, isolated and spied upon, it was against Stalin that Lenin 
was waging the most furious, most desperate but also most significant of all his 
struggles. What was at stake was nothing less than whether or not he would 
succeed in changing the course being followed by the Soviet state in a number 
of vital areas: bureaucratic degeneration, the excessive power wielded by the 
future dictator, and tendencies towards oppression of the national minorities 
(Liebman 1975, 419). 
Lenin lost this fight, and it was left to Leon Trotsky, his closest collaborator 
after 1917, to continue the struggle to preserve the real lessons of the 
Russian Revolution from their perversion at the hands of Stalin and the 
state capitalist ruling class he represented. 
 
‘Too Russian’ 
As Stalin reinforced authoritarianism inside the Soviet Union, a parallel 
reinforcement of authoritarianism took place in the Communist Parties 
that looked to Russia for inspiration. This is a complicated story, whose 
outlines can only be sketched in this short article. 
 The organizational theses cited above – the theses that Lenin 
warned were ‘too Russian’ – were introduced to the Third Congress of the 
Communist International, July 12, 1921. But they were really an after-
thought. At that Congress, the leading members of the Russian movement 
were preoccupied with other, much more pressing questions. An ultraleft 
and voluntarist leadership (encouraged by some leading members of the 
Russian Party) had captured control of much of the European communist 
movement, leading to a catastrophe in the ‘March actions’ in Germany. In 
March of 1921, the German Communist Party (KPD) – a real mass party 
with some 400,000 members (Cliff 1990, 225) – attempted a workers’ 
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uprising, even though only a minority of the working class followed its 
lead. ‘The inevitable collapse of the adventure was followed by a savage 
repression. The KPD was outlawed. Membership fell catastrophically to 
150,000 or less and thousands of militants were imprisoned,’ (Hallas 1985, 
64) and ‘tens of thousands lost their jobs’ (Cliff 1990, 225). Given that the 
KPD was the most important communist organization outside Russia, and 
given that both Lenin and Trotsky were convinced that without workers’ 
power in Germany, their situation in Russia was hopeless, this catastrophe 
understandably dominated the Third Congress of the Comintern, meeting 
as it did in the wake of these terrible events. 
 ‘A purely mechanical conception of proletarian revolution’ wrote 
Leon Trotsky in a summation of the main lessons of the Third Congress, 
‘has led certain groups of comrades to construe theories which are false to 
the core: the false theory of an initiating minority which by its heroism 
shatters “the wall of universal passivity” among the proletariat. The false 
theory of uninterrupted offensives ... the false theory of partial battles 
which are waged by applying the methods of armed insurrection’ (Trotsky 
1972a, 295-296). For Trotsky, socialism ‘can be gained only by the skilled 
conduct of battles and, above all, by first conquering the majority of the 
working class. This is the main lesson of the Third Congress’ (296). In this 
summation of the key lessons of the Third Congress, Trotsky does not even 
mention the organizational question. In a separate speech on the same 
subject, he mentions it once, but only in passing. The key thing at the Third 
Congress was not party organization, but rather explaining to an impatient 
newly radicalized generation that it was necessary sometimes to 
‘strategically retreat’: 
In the March days [in Germany in 1921] – and I say this quite openly – we did 
not have behind us one-fifth or even one-sixth of the working class and we 
suffered a defeat... [A]fter such a defeat we must retreat... We must say to the 
working class... on the basis of facts we have become convinced that in this 
struggle we had only one-sixth of the workers behind us. But we must number 
at least four-sixths or two-thirds, in order to seriously think of victory; and to 
this end we must develop and safeguard those mental, spiritual, material and 
organizational forces which are our bonds with the class... [T]his signifies a 
strategic retreat for the sake of preparation (Trotsky 1972b, 308-309). 
Here Trotsky was developing a strategic orientation that was to emerge in 
full flower in, what is for socialists today, the most important of the early 
congresses of the Communist International, the Fourth Congress. At this 
congress – the last where Trotsky and Lenin played a role, and the last 
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Congress not to be twisted and distorted by the baneful influence of 
Stalinism – the delegates formulated in clear and persuasive fashion the 
‘united front tactic’: 
The united front tactic is simply an initiative whereby the Communists propose 
to join with all workers belonging to other parties and groups and all unaligned 
workers in a common struggle to defend the immediate, basic interests of the 
working class against the bourgeoisie.... It is particularly important when using 
the united front tactic to achieve not just agitational but also organizational 
results. Every opportunity must be used to establish organizational footholds 
among the working masses themselves... The main aim of the united front 
tactic is to unify the working masses through agitation and organization. The 
real success of the united front tactic depends on a movement ‘from below,’ 
from the rank-and-file of the working masses. Nevertheless, there are 
circumstances in which Communists must not refuse to have talks with the 
leaders of the hostile workers’ parties, providing the masses are always kept 
fully informed of the course of these talks (Trotsky 1983a, 396). 
This amounted to a complete turn in the orientation of radical 
socialists around the world. It was the magnificent obsession of Trotsky 
and Lenin to facilitate this turn. It was part of the enormous effort to make 
the political practices forged in conditions in Tsarist Russia closer to the 
Third World rather than the First, relevant to socialists operating in 
advanced capitalist societies, often in a situation of liberal democracy. In 
the context, this meant arguing for a ‘retreat’ from the extreme ‘leftism’ of 
the first years of the revolution. Hence at the Third Congress, they had a 
division of labour, Trotsky explaining the case for a ‘retreat’ in Western 
Europe, and Lenin explaining the case for a ‘retreat’ inside Russia. 
Trotsky’s report was ‘Theses of the Third World Congress on the 
International Situation’ (Trotsky 1983b, 184-203). Lenin’s report was 
‘Theses for a Report on the Tactics of the RCP’ (Lenin 1983, 203-210), 
where he was intently focussed on explaining the transition to ‘state 
capitalism’ in the direction of the new Russian state – a transition made 
necessary by the devastation of civil war and foreign intervention. 
These reports by Trotsky and Lenin were the critical documents of 
the Congress. There is little evidence that either of them paid very much 
attention to the question of party organization. The theses seem to have 
been drafted by a Finnish communist, Otto Kuusinen with some 
involvement from the Hungarian Béla Kun.1 The job of delivering the 
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 Thanks to John Riddell for assistance in sorting out the details by which the organizational 
report was prepared and delivered. 
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report to the Congress was given to a German by the name of Wilhelm 
Koenen. But the involvement of Koenen, Kun and others in the preparation 
and delivery of this quite important report, raises some real questions. 
Koenen was an individual of minor importance in the history of that 
tumultuous epoch. He had been on the executive of the Independent Social 
Democrats (USPD) in 1920. The majority of that very large party voted in 
October 1920 to join the German communists (Deutscher 1977, 50). It is 
perhaps his affiliation with the USPD majority that temporarily pushed 
Koenen into the spotlight. He would soon return to the obscurity from 
which he came. By 1924 he was out of the German communist party, and 
there is some suspicion that he had been one of the ‘corrupt leaders’ of the 
USPD.2 
 There is another aspect to Koenen’s role that is worth noting. 
According to Koenen, the report that he delivered on 10 July 1921 ‘was 
assigned to me only in the course of the last week.’ The person who was to 
have originally given the report was the Hungarian Béla Kun (Koenen n.d.). 
But why would Kun be given any leadership role at this Congress? The 
disastrous March Action, which had crushed the KPD in Germany, was in 
large measure carried out under his watch. Béla Kun had been ‘Zinoviev’s 
emissary’ according to Tony Cliff (1990, 224). Grigory Zinoviev was 
chairman of the Comintern’s executive committee and had been the leading 
proponent of the ‘theory of the offensive’ which led to the cataclysm of the 
March Action (Broué 1964). But Zinoviev too was not put out to pasture 
after what should have been a disgrace, but remained as chairman of the 
Comintern’s executive committee. Further, it is largely due to Zinoviev that 
Koenen’s report was passed. The first speaker to follow Koenen was a 
delegate from Switzerland who said that the report was ‘an unsuitable 
basis for discussion.’ He called the report ‘eighteen pages of mishmash, 
which does indeed contain some good ideas, but is kept so vague, so 
blurred, that it does not deserve the name ‘Theses’ at all.’ He moved ‘to 
reject these Theses without discussion.’ But Zinoviev intervened 
immediately, made a few demagogic points in support of Koenen, 
                                                 
2
 In conversation with Heinrich Brandler, who had been a leader of the KPD in the 1920s, 
Deutscher asks: ‘How much truth was there in Trotsky’s view, expressed somewhere, that 
already in the Lenin period, around 1920, Zinoviev introduced the corruption of leaders of 
foreign parties as a matter of course? At first Brandler confirms this without reservation, and 
mentions the names of corrupt leaders of the independents, among them the name of 
Koenen’ (Deutscher 1977, 50). 
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reminded the delegates ‘that we are very tired,’ and won the delegates to 
adopt the theses (Koenen n.d.). 
 This is a strange tale. Theses which were to become iconic in 
‘Leninist’ organizing, were delivered by a minor figure from the German 
party, taking over from Béla Kun who should have been a disgraced ex-
leader after his conduct in the March Action, and saved in the end by 
Gregory Zinoviev, another Comintern leader whose recent actions should 
have disqualified him from any leadership role. This is the context in which 
the Third Congress of the Comintern voted to accept the theses on 
organization, a bizarrely detailed text, with fifty-eight subsections, that 
include among other items, a universal prescription for weekly meetings, 
the ‘duty to make reports,’ the universal appropriateness of a factory cell 
structure for local organizing, and the need for ‘enthusiastic’ involvement 
in party campaigns. Perhaps this level of detail was felt necessary because 
of the inexperience of the young activists who had recently joined the 
Communist Parties in the west. Perhaps it reflected the obsessions of 
Koenen. We can only speculate. What we do know is that, in contrast to the 
sensitive and careful reports of Lenin and Trotsky, it reads like the worst 
kind of formalism and schematism, and has all the hallmarks of a report 
hastily thrown together and hastily passed. Lenin and Trotsky, the pre-
eminent leaders of the early Comintern, were understandably pre-
occupied with bigger questions. 
 Now as in all reflections on history, it is best not to judge actors at 
one point in time with lessons that could only be learned years later. It is 
probable that at the time, the full measure of the March catastrophe had 
yet to be absorbed. That is why Trotsky was bending every effort to explain 
the seriousness of the situation – precisely because it was not understood. 
It is also the case that if in 1922 Lenin was to see these theses as ‘too 
Russian,’ in 1921 he did not yet see the problem. That year, in letters 
addressed to authors of the thesis – including Koenen – Lenin had said that 
he read the ‘draft theses on the organizational question with great 
pleasure. I think you have done a very good job’ (Lenin 1977a, 318). If one 
of the bizarre features of the theses is its incessant detail, Lenin’s direction 
was to add even more! 
 There is another road that this analysis could take. For obvious 
reasons, the focus of Lenin, Trotsky and the other socialists in Russia had 
been on overthrowing Tsarism and challenging capitalism in their own 
country, a country of peasants, illiteracy, autocracy and impoverishment. 
The fact that even after the catastrophe of March 1921, key architects of 
that catastrophe like Zinoviev and Béla Kun could be allowed leadership 
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roles ‘directing’ the new Communist International, is quite possibly an 
indication that Lenin, Trotsky and other leaders of the Comintern did not 
really appreciate a) the scale of the disaster that had unfolded; b) the ill-
suited nature of the authoritarian directives which had come down from 
the Comintern to the German KPD; and c) the way in which both of those 
exposed the chasm which separated conditions in Germany from 
conditions in Russia. March 1921, in other words, was part of the harsh 
reality-check that Bolshevism encountered in its difficult move from 
autocratic semi-feudal Russia to capitalist and (sometimes) democratic 
Europe.3 
 If these elements weren’t clear in 1921, they were quite a bit clearer 
one year later. By 1922 Lenin and Trotsky were starkly aware of the extent 
of the terrible isolation they faced. Lenin (as indicated above) and Trotsky 
had always been cognizant of the fact that without a revolution in the 
advanced countries, their revolution was doomed. But only with the defeat 
of the March Action did it become clear how difficult this new wave of 
revolution was going to be, and only after some months had passed did the 
scale of the catastrophe that the March Action had wreaked on the KPD and 
the prospects for socialism become apparent. And with their attention 
focussed on this huge difficulty, the gulf that separated the organizational 
measures appropriate to ‘Russian conditions’ and those appropriate to 
Western European conditions, became all too clear. 
 So when one year later, in preparing for the Fourth Congress, Lenin 
turned his attention again to the Kuusinen/Koenen/Kun report, he was 
horrified. His reaction to this document was completely different from his 
cursory praise of it the year previous. In the context of debilitating illness, 
Lenin was struggling on two fronts – to win the communist movement to 
the united front tactic, and to combat the Stalinist degeneration of his own 
party. It is clear that he saw a link between these two issues and the 
organization report passed just the previous year. He prefaces his remarks 
to the Congress by apologizing for the brevity of his speech: ‘you will 
understand that after my lengthy illness I am not able to make a long 
report.’ But in this short report, ‘Five Years of the Russian Revolution and 
the Prospects of the World Revolution,’ he devotes almost one-fifth of it to 
a criticism of Koenen’s organizational document. Lenin concludes his 
report with the condemnation of the document, cited above: ‘[W]e made a 
big mistake with this resolution... we blocked our own road to further 
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 The account of the Comintern’s negative role in the catastrophe of the March Action is based 
on Pierre Broué’s magnificent The German Revolution: 1917-1923 (2006). 
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success,’ and then urges Comintern members everywhere to approach this 
question with a critical perspective: 
[O]ur most important task today is to study and to study hard. Our foreign 
comrades, too, must study.... [F]irst of all, among other things they must learn 
to understand what we have written about the organizational structure of the 
Communist Parties, and what the foreign comrades have signed without 
reading and understanding. This must be their first task.... The resolution is too 
Russian, it reflects Russian experience. That is why it is quite unintelligible to 
foreigners, and they cannot be content with hanging it in a corner like an icon 
and praying to it. Nothing will be achieved that way. They must assimilate part 
of the Russian experience. Just how that will be done, I do not know (Lenin 
1980, 431). 
These are not peripheral comments by Lenin. They are his central remarks 
in one of his last public appearances, words wrenched out of a dying body, 
appealing to his followers ‘to study’ and to not hang the organizational 
resolution ‘in a corner like an icon and praying to it.’4 
 He lost this battle. The formalistic, schematic ‘too Russian’ precepts 
for organization were in fact fossilized into an icon. Critical study of them 
was made almost impossible. The Leninism that emerged onto the stage of 
history was exactly the caricature that Lenin had feared. 
 But this caricature was useful to the dictatorship that was in 
formation. At the Fifth Congress – the first one without Lenin, and with the 
campaign against Trotsky now in full swing – one of the key decisions was 
to ‘bolshevize’ the non-Russian communist parties. The context was the 
emergence of the ‘troika’ of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin as the heirs of 
the now deceased Lenin. The ‘bolshevization’ amounted to making 
universal, the authoritarian methods of the underground Bolsheviks, 
regardless of conditions prevailing in other countries – including liberal 
democracies in the advanced capitalist world. In this, Koenen’s schematic 
theses were quite useful. The parties were to be tightly run, 
bureaucratically centralized operations, sections of an international party, 
headed of course by the Russian. The hymn to centralism by James Cannon, 
cited earlier, was in the context of defending this ‘bolshevization’ to his co-
thinkers in the United States. British socialist Duncan Hallas very clearly 
captures the essence of this campaign: 
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 His last public speech was delivered 22 November 1922 (Lewin 1973, 4). The speech quoted 
here was delivered 04 November 1922. 
Socialist Studies: the Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies 5(2) Fall 2009: 41-63 
60 
‘Bolshevisation’ was the watchword of the fifth congress of the Comintern in 
June-July 1924. It was the precise counterpart to the cult of the dead Lenin in 
the USSR and its actual content was the same: unqualified submission to the 
Troika as the supposed guardians of Leninist orthodoxy and hostility to all 
critical voices, above all to Trotsky. Naturally, this ‘Leninism’ had nothing in 
common with the spirit of Lenin’s own politics (Hallas 1985, 106). 
 Fernando Claudin, in his monumental history of the Comintern, 
describes the baneful effect this had inside Communist Parties around the 
world. ‘The campaign for “Bolshevization” of the Communist parties which 
began in 1924 was expressed in the German party, as in the others, by a 
strengthening of bureaucratic centralism and a rejection of national 
realities’ (Claudin 1975, 141). At the end, the Stalinist dictatorship had at 
its disposal disciplined, authoritarian parties which tragically combined 
sometimes brilliant work in their own working classes, with subservience 
to the twists and turns of the new Russian ruling class – all in the name of a 
perversion of the actual meaning of the term ‘democratic centralism.’ 
 
Conclusion 
The Stalinist Parties that selectively seized the authoritarian Leninism of 
the underground period and ignored the democratic Leninism of the 
revolutionary period – these parties have largely been swept from the 
stage of history. Liebman’s book is a scholarly, comprehensive and 
devastatingly persuasive critique of that Stalinist ‘moment.’ His work is the 
necessary starting point for a reconceptualization of Lenin for socialists in 
the twenty-first century. But if the Stalinist parties are gone, one-sided and 
‘too Russian’ interpretations of Leninism are not their exclusive preserve – 
such interpretations are ubiquitous. None of the quotes from Lenin here 
are from secret archives. All of them are widely accessible on the web, and 
before the rise of the Internet were widely available in the Collected Works 
of Lenin. But this Lenin – the pro-fantasy Lenin who warned about the 
dangers of a ‘too Russian’ translation of the Russian Revolutionary 
experience – this Lenin is almost never cited. The silence on this Lenin, and 
the amplification of the What Is To Be Done Lenin (itself in a caricaturized 
form, as Lars T. Lih has so forcefully indicated) speaks volumes about the 
way in which Leninism migrated to the Western World. 
 This article began by counterposing the approach of Liebman to 
that of Žižek, suggesting that we need more Liebman and less Žižek in the 
Lenin Studies which is developing in our century. Elsewhere I have written 
a longer critique of Žižek’s Leninism (Kellogg, 2008). For my purposes 
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here, it is enough to assert that Žižek needs to not promote the ‘Inner 
Greatness of Stalinism’ but seriously to engage with the ‘Inner Bankruptcy 
of Stalinism’ so clearly demonstrated by Marcel Liebman among others. 
Liebman concludes his book by outlining this bankruptcy, and it is an 
appropriate place to conclude this article: 
Of course... [Stalin and Stalinism] dressed themselves up in the finery of 
dialectics... But although Stalinist practice often referred to dialectics... Stalinist 
dialectics was merely the ideological cover for the ramblings of a short-sighted 
pragmatism. If Stalinism is Leninism plus administrative tyranny and plus 
bureaucratic terror, it is also Leninism minus dialectics. It is thus Leninism 
impoverished by being deprived of that leaven which has made of it, even in its 
mistakes, and in spite of its failures, one of the richest sources of inspiration in 
the fight for socialism, one of the most fruitful contributions to men’s *sic+ 
struggle for their emancipation (Liebman 1975, 448). 
To fully appreciate and apply this contribution will require the socialist 
generation of this century to rediscover the democratic Leninism for too 
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